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Abstract: From the 1980s to onwards trade liberalization policies have been 
widely used in many countries. This process has significant impacts on many 
economic aspects one of which is on the labour market.  However, the direction 
of the relationship between trade reforms and the labour market is controversial. 
This study aims to analyse the effects of a specific trade reform of import tariff 
changes on the formal and informal labour market for Turkey. For that purpose, 
we benefit from Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model that relies on 
nonlinear simultaneous equations. We construct an updated Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) which is compatible with our model. Our findings indicate that 
while there is a positive relationship between formal labour employment in total 
and import tariff rates, the negative relationship occurs between informal 
employment and tariff rates.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
By the post-Washington process, most of the countries started to apply liberalized trade 
policies. Developing of endogenous growth theories which mention the productivity-enhancing 
technology spill over effects of trade liberalization also serve this fact. From this point forth, 
trade liberalization has widely extended in recent decades. Consequently, after a sharp decline 
in 2009 following the 2008 global crisis, world trade to GDP reached 58.04% in 2015 (World 
Bank, 2017). 
Increase in trade liberalization often associates with increasing informality in the labour 
sector due to increased foreign competition. This effect is thought to be crucial, especially for 
developing economies.  These economies face high informality rates since either people find it 
optimal or are restrained working in the informal sector. Firms may also find it optimal to 
employ formal and informal labour simultaneously to maximize their profits. Therefore, a 
substantial amount of employment is informal in the developing world. 
Reducing the level of informal labour is one of the essential policies of governments 
since it is disturbing to economic development. For that matter, Turkey is no exception for 
having the presence of a large informal labour sector. By 2016, the unregistered rate of labour 
in Turkey is 33.5% of total employment (TURKSTAT), and 82.1% of this rate is coming from 
the agriculture (see Table A1 in Appendix for unregistered employment rates in Turkey in 
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agricultural and non-agricultural sectors). The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development1 
has also determined one of its aims as the increase of formal labour and premium base in the 
Medium-Term Program of 2017-2019. 
By dealing both with increasing trade in worldwide and the problem of informal 
employment, we; in this paper, try to examine the effect of a particular trade liberalization 
policy, namely, reduction in import tariffs on formal and informal labour. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first that analyses the relationship in a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) framework for Turkey. We contribute to the literature by employing an 
updated Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) by using recent Input-Output (IO) table of 2012 
featured by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). Our study also contributes to 
understanding how the labour markets in developing countries adjust to trade liberalization 
reforms. 
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we provide 
the relevant literature, including studies that rely on both partial and general equilibrium 
analyses. Section 3 introduces the characteristics of the economic model, its equations, and 
evaluates the results under different policy scenarios. Section 4 presents some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although the informal economy is recognized as one of the principal economic 
problems, there is no consensus on the definition of it. According to European Union 
Commission, undeclared work means “any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature 
but not declared to the public authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory 
systems of member states” (EU Commission, 1998: 2). Nikulin (2016) states that this approach 
assumes that criminal activities and work that does not have to be declared are excluded. ILO 
(International Labour Organization) strongly mentions the difference between employment in 
the informal sector and informal employment. Accordingly, the informal activities are 
characterized in ILO (1972) by: (i) ease of entry, (ii) reliance on indigenous resources, (iii) 
family ownership of enterprises, (iv) small scale of operation, (v) labour-intensive and adapted 
technology, (vi) skills acquired outside the formal school system, and (vii) unregulated and 
competitive markets (p.6). The report also emphasizes that the informal sector activities are 
largely ignored, rarely supported, often regulated, and sometimes actively discouraged by the 
government. 
More recent ILO and WTO (World Trade Organization) joint study of Bacchetta et al. 
(2009) defines informal workers as those who do not benefit from social security and are not 
protected by labour regulation. We also refer to that definition which has also been cited 
frequently throughout the literature (Munro, 2011). 
Before handling the informal employment, mentioning the effects of informality on the 
entire economy may be helpful. Some researchers emphasize the positive impacts of the 
informal sector (e.g., Spiro 2005). Accordingly, the informal economy that arises from high tax 
rates makes governments realize that there is a limit on how much they can spend. This 
realization helps to eliminate excessive, wasteful spending, and inefficient regulations. 
Additionally, with the decreasing effects on the cost of labour and creating new job 
opportunities, it serves to reduce unemployment rates. The official sector then is forced to 
decrease costs and improve quality due to competition. Even so, the informality is usually 
considered to be harmful to the entire economy due to its substantial adverse consequences. 
 
1 It has been operating as The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Strategy and Budget since 2018. 
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Accordingly, the informal economy makes economic statistics less reliable and therefore harms 
the success of economic policies. It also hurts the tax base as it is impossible to tax unrecorded 
activities. Danopoulos and Znidaric (2007) state that with the informal economy, government 
fiscal policy performs ineffectively due to uncertainty about the actual amount of revenue. 
Furthermore, the informal economy is easy to operate in small-scale firms, which are usually 
unproductive and inefficient. Bacchetta et al. (2009) note that informality limits the potential 
for developing countries while benefiting from the integration into the world economy and state 
that “countries with above-average sized informal economies are more than three times as likely 
to incur the adverse effects of a crisis as those with lower rates of formality”. 
Shifting of employment from the formal sector to the informal sector could also be 
undesirable since worse working conditions and lower job quality identifies the informal sector 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003, p.2). Moreover, from the workers’ perspective, the informal 
economy is characterized by lower incomes, less job security, and the absence of social benefits. 
There are some attempts to explain the relationship between trade liberalization and the 
informal economy both theoretically and empirically in the literature. Accordingly, trade 
liberalization causes firms to face increased foreign competition. Firms may replace their 
workers with the ones who accept to work as informal to reduce production costs. Currie and 
Harrison (1997) confirm that for Morocco by finding that firms started to hire more temporary 
workers after liberalized trade reforms. 
Empirical studies usually employ the removal of tariffs as a trade liberalization policy 
instrument since it is well measured relative to non-tariff barriers. From this point forth, there 
is vast literature examining the macroeconomic effects of tariff reductions. However, they 
usually focus on the influences on either poverty (e.g., Chitiga & Mabugu, 2005; Khan, 2005; 
Raihan, 2010; Mohammed, 2016) or income distribution (e.g., Siddiqui et al., 1999; Siddiqui 
& Iqbal, 2001). The literature for the effects on formal/informal labour is limited. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) analyse the effect of trade liberalization in the form of 
tariff declines on the informal sector for two countries that experienced trade barrier reductions: 
Brazil and Colombia. They observe no relationship between tariff declines and increases in 
informal employment in Brazil, while this relationship is positive but small for Colombia. They 
also find that trade policy effects are dependent on the labour market institutions. Accordingly, 
firms are more likely to respond to increased competition by reducing formal employment when 
the labour market rigidities are significant. Munro (2011) also in his review of the empirical 
literature, points to several country-specific factors such as variations in labour market rigidity, 
capital mobility, level of economic development, heterogeneity of the informal workforce, 
technological intensity, and cultural norms as the determinants of the relationship between trade 
and informality. 
Some studies which benefit from general equilibrium models (e.g., Chaudhuri & 
Banerjee, 2007; Marjit & Kar, 2007) have a specific focus on the impact of trade liberalization 
policies on the “wage” of the informal workers. Marjit and Kar (2007) test the effects of the 
withdrawal of protecting policies, such as tariffs or state subsidies. 
The studies that examine the relationship between import tariffs and employment by 
using CGE framework are quite rare, and only some of them (e.g., Davies and Thurlow, 2010; 
Alia et al., 2015; Erero & Bonga-Bonga, 2018) focus on the distinction of formal/informal 
employment markets. We do not refer to CGE studies that handle employment as a whole, but 
the review of Cirera et al. (2014) states that the synthesis of these studies suggests non-negative 
influences of trade liberalization on aggregate employment and moderate inter-sectorial labour 
reallocation impacts. 
Of the CGE based studies that discriminate between formal and informal employment 
Davies and Thurlow (2010) find that trade liberalization reduces national employment in South 
Africa, while at the same time increase formal employment and hurts informal producers. Alia 
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et al. (2015) evaluate the effects of some economic policies on the informal sector for 
Cameroon. They simulate the policy of rising salaries of civilian and military personnel 
followed by the reduction of import tax rate and conclude that this simultaneous policy is 
advantageous to the formal sector but less favourable to the informal sector. However, they do 
not simulate import tariff reduction solely. Erero and Bonga-Bonga (2018) analyse the effects 
of import tariff reduction for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and find that tariff 
reduction increases formal employment and output while hurting informal producers. 
Briefly, studies that examine the effects of import tariffs on employment with a 
particular focus on formal/informal discrimination are very limited. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first that analyses the relationship with a CGE modelling approach 
for Turkey. Additionally, as empirical literature points to the role of country-specific factors, 
focusing on a single country is thought to be sensible. 
 
3. THE CGE MODELLING 
3.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
 
In this section, we try to build our model based on the simultaneous equation system 
reflecting the functional and behavioural relations of economic agents. We adopt an open 
economy model as it is more realistic and operative to be able to observe trade variables. 
We benefit from CGE modelling as it allows to test the effects of policy changes without 
the restrictive “all else equal” assumption of partial equilibrium framework. In this way, our 
methodology allows observing the effects of different policy changes on the entire economy 
simultaneously. Thanks to improvements in mathematical computation, CGE models can also 
easily be computed and has been used in economic literature, increasingly. 
Determining the equations and mathematical formulations are generally based on the 
economic theory and some previous studies (e.g., Hosoe et al., 2010; Lofgren et al., 2002). 
However, we contribute to the literature by additionally discriminating between formal and 
informal labour. In the next step, we calculate parameters that satisfy the benchmark 
equilibrium of the economy. We develop a social accounting matrix of Turkey in 2002 in the 
context of the current project to calibrate those parameters2. 
While constructing SAM, we employ the most recent IO table from TURKSTAT 
together with other data sources3. We also rely on evaluations of the studies that compose SAM 
for Turkey, previously (e.g., Telli, 2004; Erten, 2009). In the last step, we apply different 
scenario analyses to observe the effects of the changes in the tariff rate on the formal and 
informal labour markets. Finally, we evaluate our simulation results. 
We design our CGE model based on a static multi-sectorial open economy framework4. 
By following Marjit and Kar (2007), we employ a full-employment model in a general 
equilibrium setting as the informal workers must find employment for survival. The sectors are 
determined to be compatible with the statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community, NACE Rev 2. and the Statistical Classification of Products by Activity 
 
2 For the structure of SAM see Table A2 and for the calibration results of the parameters see Table A3, A4 and 
A5 in Appendix.   
3 Data sources include but not limited to the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Strategy and 
Budget, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance, Social Security Institution and The Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey. The complete data set is available upon request from the authors. 
4 We use GAMS software in CGE analysis. The computer codes are available upon request from the authors. 
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in the European Economic Community, CPA-2008. Accordingly, we determine sectors as 
agriculture, mining, industry, energy, construction, and services. Economic agents are 
households, private enterprises, social security institution, government, and the rest of the 
world. Expenditures and revenues of each economic agent are assumed to be equal following 
the Walrasian general equilibrium approach. Under these presumptions, production, demand, 
external demand, and market clearing conditions constitute the four main equation blocks of 
CGE model. 
 
3.1.1. THE PRODUCTION BLOCK 
 
The production block is designed by nested production functions which incorporate two 
types of labour (formal and informal) and aggregated capital. Producers employ factors of 
production until the marginal revenue of each factor is equal to its price to maximize their 
profits. 
Figure 1. Structure of the production technology 
 
 
 
 
Production of output is designed as the Leontief combination of the intermediate inputs 
and the value-added. Value-added arises from the capital and the composite labour within 
Cobb-Douglas type production function. To determine output decisions and labour 
(formal/informal) input demands, firms are assumed to have several profit maximization 
problems. The first profit maximization problem of the firm to determine optimal capital and 
composite labour is  
 
max
𝑌𝑗,𝐶𝑗,𝐿𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑌𝑗𝑌𝑗 − ∑ 𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑗
 𝐶𝑗 + 𝑃𝐿𝑗𝐿𝑗 
subject to 
Yj = bjCj
βcjLj
βlj 
which allows to determine capital demand (equation (2))  and composite labour 
(equation(3)) . In the second stage, firms decide to employ formal and informal labour 
according to following profit maximization problem.  
 
max
𝐿𝑗,𝐹𝐿𝑗,𝐼𝐿𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝐿𝑗𝐿𝑗 − ∑ 𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑗
𝑗
 𝐹𝐿𝑗 + 𝑃𝐼𝐿𝑗𝐿𝑗  
subject to 
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Lj = oj(γfljFLj
ϑj + γiljILj
ϑj)
1
ϑj 
 
We modify standard approaches mentioned above with constant elasticity substitution 
(CES) function in the production of composite labour input to formulate the relationship 
between two types of labour and production. 𝜗𝑗 in the composite labour specification is  
elasticity of substitution between formal  and informal labour. When 𝜗𝑗= 1 formal and informal 
labour turns out to be perfect substitute and employment tends to be favour in the more 
productive labour input. Another extreme case occurs when 𝜗𝑗=0. In this case, composite labour 
equation will be Leontief type function where formal and informal labour are perfect 
complements. 
In the third stage, firm’s maximization problem below yields the remaining behavioural 
equation of the firms.  
 
max
𝑍𝑗,𝑌𝑗,𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑍𝑗𝑍𝑗 − (𝑃𝑍𝑗𝑍𝑗)  + ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑖
𝑗
𝑋𝑖𝑗 
 
subject to  
𝑍𝑗 = min (
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑗
,
𝑌𝑗
𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑗
 ) 
   
As the kinks in isoquants of Leontief production function in the constraint employed in 
the production of gross domestic output cause difficulties in numerical computations, by 
following Hosoe et al. (2010) we use equation (8) which reflects the zero-profit condition. 
Solving these optimizations finally provides following equations in the production block. 
 
Composite Factor: Yj = bjCj
βcjLj
βlj
 (1) 
Capital Demand: Cj =
βcjPYj
PCj
Yj (2) 
Composite Labour Demand Lj =
β𝑙jPYj
P𝐿j
Yj (3) 
Composite Labour Input: Lj = oj(γfljFLj
ϑj + γiljILj
ϑj)
1
ϑj (4) 
Formal Labour Demand: FLj = [
oj
ϑjγfljPLj
PFLj
]
1
1−ϑjLj (5) 
Informal labour Demand: ILj = [
oj
ϑjγiljPLj
PILj
]
1
1−ϑjCj (6) 
Intermediate Input: Xi,j = axi,jZj (7) 
Production Yj = ayjZj (8) 
Price of the j-th domestic output PZj = ayjPYj + ∑ axi,jPQi
i
 (9) 
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      where: 𝑌𝑗= composite factor produced in the second stage and used in the third stage by 
the j-th sector, 𝑏𝑗=scaling coefficient in the composite factor production function, 𝐶𝑗= capital 
demand of the j-th sector, 𝐿𝑗= composite labor input of the j-th sector, 𝛽𝑙𝑗= labor share 
coefficient in the composite production function, 𝛽𝑐𝑗= capital share coefficient in the composite 
production function, 𝑃𝑌𝑗= price of the j-th composite factor, 𝑃𝐶𝑗= price of the capital demand 
of the j-th sector, 𝑜𝑗= scaling coefficient of the j-th substitution, 𝛾𝑓𝑙𝑗= formal labor share 
coefficient in the labor input substitution, 𝐹𝐿𝑗= formal labor demand of the j-th sector, 𝜗𝑗= 
elasticity of substitution in the composite labour input, 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑗= informal labor share coefficient 
in labor input substitution, 𝐼𝐿𝑗= informal labor demand of the j-th sector, 𝑃𝐿𝑗= price of the j-
th composite labour input, 𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑗= price of the j-th formal labor, 𝑃𝐼𝐿𝑗= price of the j-th informal 
labour, 𝑋𝑖,𝑗= intermediate input of the i-th good used by the j-th sector, 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗= input 
requirement coefficient of the intermediate input for a unit output of the j-th good, 𝑎𝑦𝑗= input 
requirement coefficient of the j-th composite good for a unit output of the j-th good, 𝑍𝑗= gross 
domestic output the j-th sector, 𝑃𝑍𝑗= price of the j-th gross domestic output, 𝑃𝑄𝑖= price of the 
i-th composite good. 
 
Our model employs widely used Armington (1969) assumption, which considers 
imperfect substitutability between domestic goods and imports. We benefit from equation (9) 
which represents a CES function to capture this relationship. Equation (10) and (11) shows the 
demand for imported and domestic goods, respectively. 
 
Composite Good: Qi = γi(δmiMi
ηi
+ δdiDi
ηi)
1
ηi (10) 
Imported Good: Mi = [
γi
ηiδmiPQi
(1 + τi
m)PMi
]
1
1−ηiQi (11) 
Domestic Good: Di = [
γi
ηiδdiPQi
PDi
]
1
1−ηiQi (12) 
 
where: 𝑄𝑖= The i-th Armington composite good, 𝛾𝑖= scaling coefficient in the 
Armington composite good production, 𝛿𝑚𝑖= import input share coefficients in the Armington 
composite good production function, 𝑀𝑖= the i-th imported good, 𝛿𝑑𝑖= domestic good input 
share coefficients in the Armington composite good production function, 𝐷𝑖= the i-th domestic 
good, 𝜂𝑖 = elasticity of substitution in the Armington composite good, 𝜏𝑗𝑚= import tax on the 
j-th good, 𝑃𝑀𝑖= price of the i-th imported good, 𝑃𝐷𝑖= price of the i-th domestic good. 
 
3.1.2. THE DEMAND BLOCK 
 
Equations in the demand block display the economic behaviours of the private sector 
(including households and enterprises), government and the rest of the world. Economic agents 
in the private sector can receive income from production factors, government transfers, and the 
rest of the world. The level of savings is determined by total income and the average propensity 
to save. On the other hand, the level of consumption emerges from the utility maximization of 
private sector subject to net income.  Private sector maximizes its consumption subject to net 
income. Net income (NI) is the residual of income after subtraction of transfers from enterprises 
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to households, private savings, income tax, foreign debt interest adjusted with exchange rate, 
corporation tax and public factor income from household’s gross income. Relevant 
maximization problem is as following. Households choose optimal consumption bundle to 
reach maximum utility given income constraint mostly shaped by composite labour and capital 
endowment. For household income, we assume a uniform endowment prices of composite labour 
income (𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑡) which implicitly embeds the productivity differences between formal and 
informal employment. Since informal labour’s income are hard to track for government ,only 
formal labour income derives income taxes as in the equation (16). The optimization problem 
of households is   
max
𝑋𝑃𝑖
𝑈𝑈 = ∏ 𝑋𝑖
αi
𝑖
 
subject to 
∑ 𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑄𝑖
𝑖
= 𝑁𝐼 
 
After implementing Lagrange multiplier method, we reach private sector consumption 
as in the equation (12).  
Private Sector 
Consumption: 
XPi =
αi
PQi
(NI) (12) 
 
 
Income HI = ∑(LEtPLEt)
h
+ (CE × PCE) + GTRHH (13) 
 +GTREE + EETRH + FFTRH + FFTRF  
Net Income  NI=HI−EETRH − SP − Td − ξFFTRE − FTRG (14) 
Private Savings: SP = sspHI  (15) 
 
where: 𝑋𝑃𝑖= private sector consumption of the i-th good, 𝛼𝑖= share parameter in the 
utility function, 𝐻𝐼= private sector income, 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐻= transfers from enterprises to the 
households, 𝑆𝑃= private savings, 𝑇𝑑= income tax, 𝜉 = exchange rate, 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐸= foreign debt 
interest, 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐺= corporation tax and public factor income, 𝐿𝐸𝑡= endowment of the t-th labor, 
𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑡= price of the t-th labour endowment, 𝐶𝐸= capital endowment, 𝑃𝐶𝐸= price of the capital 
endowment, 𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐻= government transfers to the households, 𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐸= government transfers 
to the enterprises, 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐻= transfers from enterprises to the households, 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻= workers’  
foreign exchange earnings, 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐹= enterprise exchange rate earnings, 𝑠𝑠𝑝= average 
propensity of savings by the household. 
 
The government receives revenues from income taxes, corporation taxes, indirect taxes 
(other than import taxes), import tariff revenues, production factor incomes and the transfers 
from the rest of the world. Government expenditures include purchases of goods and services, 
foreign debt payments and the transfer payments to households, enterprises and the social 
security system. The government also saves a fixed proportion of its income. 
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where: 𝜏𝑑= income tax rate, 𝑇𝑗
𝑧= other indirect taxes, 𝜏𝑗
𝑧= production tax rate on the 
j-th good, 𝑇𝑖𝑚= import tariff on the i-th good, 𝜏𝑚= import tariff rate, 𝑋𝐺𝑖= government 
consumption of the i-th good, 𝜇𝑖= share of the i-th good in government consumption, 𝐺𝐼= 
government income, 𝐹𝐺𝐷𝐼= public foreign debt interest payments, 𝐺𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆= government 
transfers to the social security system, 𝑆𝐺= public savings, 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐺= net unilateral transfers to 
government from abroad, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃= social security system payments, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑇= social security 
system employers’ premium, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑇= social security system employees’ premium, ℓ𝑤= 
employer premium rate, ℓ𝑒 = employee premium rate, 𝑠𝑠𝑔= average propensity for savings by 
the government . 
 
Total savings consists of private savings, public savings, and foreign savings.  The value 
of foreign savings, which also reflects the trade balance, is adjusted by the exchange rate. In the 
model, total savings are equal to the total investments. 
 
Total Investment: XVi =
λi
PQi
(SP + SG + ξSF)  (25) 
 
where: 𝑋𝑉𝑖= demand for the i-th investment good, 𝜆𝑖= expenditure share of the i-th 
good in total investment, 𝑆𝐹= foreign savings. 
 
3.1.3. THE EXTERNAL DEMAND BLOCK 
 
Producers decide the composition of the final commodity production, which they sell 
domestically or to abroad. They supply goods either domestically or externally and determine 
the structure of this combination according to the profit maximization. For that matter, we 
Income Taxes: Td = τd [∑(LEtPLEt)
h
+ (CE × PCE)] 
 
(16) 
Other Indirect Taxes: Tj
z = τj
zPZjZj  (17) 
Import Tariff: Ti
m = τmPMiMi  (18) 
Consumption: 
XGi =
μi
PQi
(GI − ξFGDI − GTRSS
− GTRHH − GTREE − SG) 
 
(19) 
Income: 
GI = Td + ∑ Tj
z
j
+ ∑ Tj
m
j
+ FTRG
+ FFTRG 
 
(20) 
Transfers to SSS GTRSS = SSPP − SSPWT − SSPET  (21) 
Employers Premium  SSPWT = ℓw ∑ FLjPFLj
j
 
 
(22) 
Employee Premium  SSPET = ℓe ∑ CjPCj
j
   (23) 
Government Savings SG = ssgGI  (24) 
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benefit from constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, which assumes an imperfect 
substitution between the domestic goods and the exports. 
 
Gross Domestic Output: Zi = θi(εeiEi
ϕi
+ εdiDi
ϕi)
1
ϕi (25) 
Exports: Ei = [
θi
ϕiεei(1 + τi
z)PZi
PEi
]
1
1−ϕi
Zi 
(26) 
Domestic Good Di = [
θi
ϕiεdiPZi
PDi
]
1
1−ϕi
Zi 
(27) 
 
 
where: 𝜃𝑖= scaling coefficient of the i-th gross domestic output, 𝜀𝑒𝑖= export share 
coefficient for the i- th transformation, 𝐸𝑖= the i-th exported good, 𝜙𝑖= elasticity of 
transformation of the i-th good transformation production function, 𝜀𝑑𝑖= domestic share 
coefficient for the i-th transformation, 𝑃𝐸𝑖= price of the i-th exported good. 
 
 
We utilize from equations (28) and (29) to distinguish the export and import prices 
concerning world prices. In this process, we also employ a small country assumption for Turkey 
such that does not have significant influences on world prices. Finally, we employ equation 
(30) to inject the balance of payments relations to the model. 
 
Export Prices: PEi = ξPWi
e (28) 
Import Prices: PMi = ξPWi
m (29) 
The Balance of Payment 
Constraint: 
∑ PWi
eEi
i
+ SF = ∑ PWi
mMi
i
 (30) 
 
where: 𝑃𝑊𝑖
𝑒= export price in terms of foreign currency, 𝑃𝑊𝑖
𝑚 = import price in terms 
of foreign currency. 
 
3.1.4 THE EXTERNAL DEMAND BLOCK 
 
In this block, we set the equations that satisfy the market clearing conditions. Goods 
market equilibrium indicates that the total supply of Armington composite good is either used 
as intermediate and investment goods or consumed by the private sector and the government. 
Equilibrium conditions of each factor market require that the total initial endowments of the 
factors are equal to the total demands of them. 
 
Goods Market Equilibrium:  XPi + XGi + XVi + ∑ Xi,j
j
= Qi     
(31) 
Labour Market Equilibrium:  ∑ FLj + ILj
j
= ∑ LEt
t
 (32) 
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Capital Market Equilibrium:  ∑ Cj
j
= CE (33) 
 
The above listed simultaneous equations are solved through the General Algebraic 
Modelling System (GAMS) software to obtain the parameters of the benchmark equilibrium. 
In that process, we utilize a SAM for Turkey, which is constructed to be compatible with our 
model. We calibrated some of the parameters endogenously or by deriving from the SAM.  For 
the remaining parameters, we use presumptions.  
Detailed calibration results and input requirement coefficients are shown in Appendix.  
To reflect the differences of substitution between informal and formal labour across sectors, we 
set the following elasticities for each sector considering the ratio of informal labour to total 
employment in the SAM: agriculture (0.32), mining (0.04), industry (0.07), energy (0.09), 
construction (0.08) and services (0.05). Here we assume a higher income substitution in the 
agriculture sector and from these elasticities the highest calibrated informal labour share 
coefficient in labour input substitution (𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑗) are found in agriculture as well by 0.60.  
As the main focus in the paper is to see the effects of import tariffs on employment, we 
use  average tariffs rate data from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) of World Bank for 
import tariff rate in agriculture, mining and industry. The highest tariff rate is in the agriculture 
sector by 18% and the lowest tariff rate is approximately 1% in mining. The industry tariff rate 
of 6% is also set for energy, construction and services. 
After reaching an optimal solution that satisfies the benchmark equilibrium, we apply 
different import tariff policy scenarios to test the effects of changes in the import tariff rates on 
formal and informal labour markets. We present the evaluation of the results in the next section. 
 
4. THE IMPORT TARIFF POLICY RESULTS 
 
In this section, we evaluate two different policy scenario to test the impacts of the 
changes in import tariffs on the labour market. In the first scenario, we apply 20%, 40%, and 
60% reductions of import tariff rate to the benchmark equilibrium from which we obtained the 
calibration of parameters. In the second scenario, we test the effects of 20%, 40%, and 60% 
increase in import tariff rates. Table 1 reports the % changes in total, formal, and informal 
labour after the trade policy reforms. 
 
4.1 SCENARIO 1: DECREASE IN IMPORT TARIFF RATE 
 
The results of scenario 1 indicate that the decrease in import tariff rate causes an increase 
in informal labour. Informal labour grows in all sectors except services. 60% import tariff rate 
cut leads to falls in employment by 0.48% in the service sector. On the other hand, the largest 
increase in informal employment arises in the industrial sector by 2.80%. 
Import tariff reduction causes a decrease in the total formal labour. 60% of import tariff 
cut causes a decrease in formal employment by 0.15%. Contrarily, formal labour in mining, 
industry, expands. However, increasing employment in those sectors does not compensate for 
the employment losses from the other sectors. 
Similar to the changes in formal labour, import tariff reduction leads mostly to a 
decrease in total employment, as well. Import tariff rates have to be cut down by 60% to achieve 
slight employment gains of 0.03%. However, employment expansion comes for the most part 
from the informal sector. The decline in total employment arises from the decrease in 
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employment in the agriculture, energy, construction, and service sectors. On the other hand, we 
found that reduction of import tariff rates would lead to an increase in the total employment in 
mining and industry. Accordingly, a 60% decrease in import tariff rates increases the 
employment in mining and industry by 2.20%, 2.53%, respectively. 
 
Table 1. The Changes in Labour Market after Policy Scenarios (%) 
 
 Scenario 1: Decrease in Import Tariff Rate 
 Agriculture Mining Industry Energy Construction Services Total 
Informal Labour  𝐼𝐿𝑗         
%20 Reduction 0.29 0.76 0.89 0.11 0.04 -0.15 0.17 
%40 Reduction 0.59 1.54 1.82 0.23 0.08 -0.31 0.34 
%60 Reduction 0.89 2.35 2.80 0.35 0.12 -0.48 0.51 
Formal Labour 𝐹𝐿𝑗        
%20 Reduction -5.00 0.70 0.79 -0.09 -0.08 -0.21 -0.05 
%40 Reduction -10.05 1.43 1.62 -0.18 -0.17 -0.43 -0.10 
%60 Reduction -15.15 2.18 2.49 -0.27 -0.26 -0.66 -0.15 
Total Labour 𝐿𝑗        
%20 Reduction -0.07 0.71 0.81 -0.05 -0.06 -0.21 -0.01 
%40 Reduction -0.15 1.44 1.65 -0.10 -0.13 -0.42 -0.02 
%60 Reduction -0.25 2.20 2.53 -0.15 -0.20 -0.64 -0.03 
Scenario 2: Increase in Import Tariff Rate 
Informal Labour  𝐼𝐿𝑗         
%20 Reduction -0.29 -0.73 -0.85 -0.11 -0.04 0.15 -0.16 
%40 Reduction -0.57 -1.44 -1.67 -0.21 -0.08 0.29 -0.32 
%60 Reduction -0.85 -2.13 -2.46 -0.31 -0.11 0.43 -0.47 
Formal Labour 𝐹𝐿𝑗        
%20 Reduction 4.94 -0.68 -0.76 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.05 
%40 Reduction 9.82 -1.35 -1.50 0.16 0.15 0.40 0.10 
%60 Reduction 14.64 -1.99 -2.20 0.24 0.23 0.59 0.14 
Total Labour 𝐿𝑗        
%20 Reduction 0.06 -0.69 -0.78 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.01 
%40 Reduction 0.10 -1.35 -1.52 0.09 0.12 0.39 0.02 
%60 Reduction 0.14 -2.00 -2.24 0.13 0.17 0.58 0.03 
 
4.2 SCENARIO 2: INCREASE IN IMPORT TARIFF RATE 
The results of scenario 2 indicate that the increase in import tariff rate causes a decrease 
in informal labour. 60% increase of import tariff rate decrease the informal labour in agriculture, 
mining, industry, energy, and construction services by 0.85%, 2.13%, 2.46%, 0.31%, and 
0.11%. The increase in the import tariff rate will cause an increase in informal labour only in 
the service sector. 60% increase in the import tariff rate will increase the informal labour in the 
service sector by 0.43%. 
Parallel to the effects on formal employment, increase in import tariff rates will cause 
expansions in total employment. 60% increase in import tariff rate will increase total 
employment by 0.03%. The increase in total employment mostly arises from the agriculture, 
energy, constructions and services. On the other hand, a 60% increase in import tariff rate will 
decrease total employment in mining and industry by 2.00% and 2.24%. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Trade liberalization policies have been used widely, especially after the 1980s. In that 
process, governments usually benefit from import tariff reduction as it is easy to operate. 
Turkey, in the process of the integration to the European Union, has adopted liberalized trade 
policies, too. However, the effects of this process on the entire economy are controversial. This 
study tries to analyse the effects of the changes in import tariff rates on the labour market by 
taking into account both formal and informal sectors in Turkey. The consequences of the labour 
market are crucial as Turkey faces both the difficulties regarding high unemployment rates and 
informality. The level of informal labour in the agricultural sector is particularly remarkable. 
From that point forth, we base our study on the impacts of changing import tariff rates on 
employment on a sectorial basis. 
As a methodology, we base our analysis on the CGE framework which employs 
simultaneous equation systems which allow us to observe the effects of different policy reforms 
relative to benchmark equilibrium. By doing so, we are also able to get rid of the lack of long-
term data which is required to make reliable estimations in empirical studies based on time 
series. We also contribute to the literature by constructing an updated SAM for Turkey which 
can also be used in future economic studies depending on CGE models. 
Our policy scenario results indicate that reduction in import tariff rates will cause an 
increase in informal labour while it decreases formal labour and total employment. In a parallel 
manner with the results of the first scenario, the second policy scenario results indicate that 
increase in import tariff rates will decrease the level of informal labour, while it increases formal 
labour and total employment. If we focus on the labour market on a sectorial basis, we observe 
that a decrease in total formal labour after the policy reform of the second scenario arise only 
in the mining and industry sectors. However, as employment in agriculture composes the largest 
part of informal labour, the relevant result is helpful since the highest increase formal labour is 
in the agricultural sector. Uniform tariff policy of either increase or decrease the rate does not 
affect the sectors in the same manner. Changing the tariff rate leads to an increase in 
employment in some sectors while a decrease in the others. In that sense, selective tariff policy 
which applies the changes of tariff rates in the sectors that could expand employment while 
conserving the rate in the others would be more effective on employment. Nevertheless, our 
findings favour protective trade policy in terms of import tariff rates for Turkey to achieve 
positive outcomes on the labour market. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 Unregistered Employment Rate in Turkey (%) 
 Total Agriculture Non-agriculture 
2014 35.0 82.3 22.3 
2015 33.6 81.2 21.2 
2016 33.5 82.1 21.7 
2017‡ 34.0 83.2 22.1 
     ‡2017 data is the average of the period January-November 2017. 
     Source: TURKSTAT, Labour Force Statistics
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 Table A2 The Structure of the Social Accounting Matrix 
 
Goods and 
Services 
Formal 
Labour 
Informal 
Labour 
Capital Social Security System Households Enterprises Government 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Import 
Tariff 
Private 
Capital 
Accumulation 
Public 
Capital 
Accumulation 
External Total 
Goods and 
Services 
intermediate 
Input 
    
household 
consumption 
 
government 
consumption 
  
private 
investment 
public 
investment 
exports demand 
Formal 
Labour 
payments to the 
formal labour 
            
formal labour 
income 
Informal 
Labour 
payments to the 
Inf.    formal 
labour 
            
informal 
labour 
income 
Capital 
payments to the 
capital 
            capital income 
Social Security 
System 
employee 
premium 
employers 
premium 
     
deficit 
transfers 
     
social security 
system 
income 
Households  
net formal 
labour 
income 
net 
informal 
labour                 
income 
 
social 
security 
payments 
 
transfers to 
the 
households 
public         
transfers to         
the households 
    
worker’s 
foreign 
exchange 
earnings 
household 
income 
Enterprises    
capital 
income 
   
production 
promotions + 
domestic debt 
interest 
payment 
    
enterprise 
foreign 
exchange 
earnings 
enterprise 
income 
Government      
direct taxes 
 
corporation 
taxes + 
public factor 
income 
 
indirect 
taxes 
import 
tariffs 
 
  
net 
unilateral 
transfers 
government 
income 
Indirect 
Taxes 
production, 
sales, export 
taxes 
            
 
indirect 
taxes 
Import 
Tariff 
import 
tariffs 
            
import 
tariffs 
Private Capital 
Accumulation 
     
private 
savings 
     
 
 
 
finance of 
private 
investments 
Public Capital 
Accumulation 
     
private 
savings 
investment 
difference 
 
public 
savings 
    
 
foreign 
savings 
finance of 
public 
investments 
External 
 
imports 
 
     
foreign debt 
interest 
payments + 
net profit                 
transfers 
public foreign 
debt interest 
payment 
     
external 
income 
Total total supply 
formal 
labour 
costs 
informal 
labour 
costs 
capital 
costs 
 
Social security 
system expenditures 
household 
expenditures 
 
enterprises 
expenditures 
government 
expenditures 
indirect 
taxes 
import 
tariff 
private 
investments 
public 
investments 
external 
expenditures 
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Table A3 Calibration of the Parameters 
 
Table A4 Other Parameters 
Parameters Definition Value 
𝒔𝒔𝒑 Average propensity for savings by the household 0.15 
𝒔𝒔𝒈 Average propensity for savings by the government 0.11 
𝓵𝒘 Employer premium rate  0.09 
𝓵𝒆 Employee premium rate  0.08 
   
 
Table A5 Input Requirement Coefficients 
𝒂𝒙𝒊,𝒋 Agriculture Mining Industry Energy Construction Services 
Agriculture 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mining 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.02 0.00 
Industry 0.12 0.14 0.38 0.02 0.32 0.10 
Energy 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.02 
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.01 
Services 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.24 
 
 Agriculture Mining Industry Energy Construction Services 
𝒃𝒋 1.84 1.93 1.90 1.65 1.85 1.96 
𝜷𝒍𝒋 0.30 0.36 0.34 0.20 0.31 0.39 
𝜷𝒄𝒋 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.80 0.69 0.61 
𝒐𝒋 4.57 2.29 2.90 6.49 3.57 2.17 
𝜸𝒇𝒍𝒋 0.40 0.91 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.88 
𝜸𝒊𝒍𝒋 0.60 0.08 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.12 
𝝑𝒋 0.32 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.05 
𝒂𝒚𝒋 0.65 0.60 0.29 0.26 0.38 0.63 
𝜸𝒊 1.65 2.12 2.06 1.15 1.01 1.40 
𝜹𝒎𝒊 0.24 0.63 0.42 0.06 0.00 0.15 
𝜹𝒅𝒊 0.76 0.37 0.58 0.94 1 0.84 
𝜼𝒊 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
𝜶𝒊 0.07 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.02 0.60 
 
𝝉𝒎 0.18 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
𝝉𝒋
𝒛 0.02 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04 
𝝁𝒊 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.93 
𝝀𝒊
𝒑
 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.08 0.48 0.12 
𝜽𝒊 3.05 1.98 1.94 7.35 5.74 2.97 
𝜺𝒆𝒊 0.81 0.69 0.62 0.95 0.93 0.81 
𝜺𝒅𝒊 0.19 0.31 0.38 0.05 0.07 0.19 
𝝓𝒊 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
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